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Eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) has often been described as a 
major challenge for EU environmental policy (Carius/Homeyer/Bar 2000; EC 
1998a). In the Agenda 2000 the European Commission concluded that “none of 
the [Central and Eastern European] Accession Countries can be expected to 
comply fully with the [environmental] acquis in the near future, given their 
present environmental problems and the need for massive investments” (EC 
1997, 67). This view begs the question why the failure of the Accession 
Countries to fully imlpement EU environmental legislation at the date of 
accession should pose a major challenge. After all, the Accession Countries 
could still complete implementation after accession.
To answer this question it is necessary to take a closer look at EU 
environmental policy and to study challenges from a perspective which takes 
additional factors into account. More specifically, it is only possible to analyse 
the implications of enlargement for EU environmental policy if one has an idea 
of the central elements which characterise policy-making in this field. This 
paper therefore begins with an analysis of three basic characteristics of 
contemporary EU environmental policy. In a second step, I look at the im­
plications of enlargement for these characteristics.
It has almost become a commonplace to note that the EU went from hav­
ing no environmental policy in the early 1970 to “having some of the most 
progressive environmental policies of any state in the world although it is not a 
state” (Jordan 1999, 1). The first factor which has a crucial impact on the 
development of EU environmental policy is the so called leader-laggard 
dynamic, primarily because this mechanism to a considerable extent accounts 
for the “tremendous expansion of environmental policies” (Zito 1999, 19). The 
leader-laggard dynamic implies that environmental pacesetters among the 
Member States and regulatory competition propel EU environmental policy 
forward.
EU environmental policy is also characterised by serious implementation 
problems (Richardson 1996, 284). Although other areas of policy-making are 
plagued by similar problems, the deficit appears to be particularly serious in the 
case of environmental legislation (Jordan 1999a, 83; Collins/Eamshaw 1992). 
To some extent the implementation deficit reflects the success of European 
environmental policy at the legislative level. Those Member States which failed 
to influence EU environmental policy as either pacesetters or latecomers at the 
legislative stage -  and for which implementation may be associated with 
relatively high financial costs or administrative problems -  are particularly 



























































































However, the implementation deficit is not the only problem which casts 
doubt on the record of EU environmental policy. It is becoming increasingly 
evident that despite the proliferation of EU environmental legislation, the overall 
state of the environment in the Member States has not significantly improved 
(EEA 1999, 23-37). Therefore the third characteristic relates to efforts to reform 
EU environmental policy, in particular initiatives to integrate environmental 
concerns into sectoral policies. These activities may be interpreted as a reaction 
to the fact that EU environmental policy has so far failed to halt overall 
environmental degradation and to achieve sustainable development, in particular 
with respect to “new” environmental problems, such as those associated with the 
transport sector or intensive agricultural practices.
These three characteristics only provide a somewhat sketchy picture of 
EU environmental policy. Nevertheless, they constitute crucial parameters for 
further development. This appears to be particularly true on the eve of 
enlargement, which may lead to a slow down, or even a reversal, of the leader- 
laggard dynamic and threatens to further increase the implementation deficit. 
Given that limited financial resources and administrative capacities are coupled 
with rapid economic development in the Accession Countries, it will be 
necessary to counteract these trends by further intensifying efforts at the 
European level to integrate environmental concerns into the sectoral policies 
which cause environmental degradation. As illustrated below, the enlargement 
process not only increases the necessity but, in conjunction with the more 
general transformation process, also creates new opportunities to promote 
sectoral environmental integration and sustainable development.
The next section sets out the basic framework for this argument. It focuses 
on the leader-laggard dynamic as the major driving force of EU environmental 
policy. The third section discusses the extent, the causes, and some of the 
implications of the implementation deficit. Section four highlights the initiatives 
to integrate environmental concerns into sectoral policies. Against this 
background, section five focuses on the implications of enlargement for each of 
the three characteristics of European environmental policy.
Regulatory Competition
In a seminal article on the “joint decision trap” Scharpf provided an explanation 
for the difficulties encountered by actors attempting to reform inefficient EU 
policies, in particular the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Scharpf, 1988). 
According to Scharpf, voting rules in the Council and the institutional self- 
interests of Member State governments account for failures to adopt new, or 
reform existing policies. Unanimous voting rules make it difficult to adopt 




























































































Member State interests. At the same time the institutional self-interest of 
Member State governments in retaining their veto rights prevents a reform of 
decision-making. As a result, stagnation and inefficient policies dominate EU 
policy-making.
Scharpf’s account of EU decision-making obviously cannot explain the 
dynamic evolution of a comprehensive body of European environmental 
legislation.1 Although several explanations have been proposed, competitive 
interaction among Member States is generally considered to be one of the most 
significant factors.2 As early as the beginning of the 1980s analysts classified the 
Member States according to their support for ambitious environmental standards 
and proffered tentative explanations of EU environmental policy-making in 
terms of the relative influence of pacesetters and latecomers.3 It is possible to 
distinguish ecological, economic, administrative, and political influences on the 
interests of Member States in EU environmental policy formation.4
Ecological determinants of Member State interests reflect various factors 
influencing the state of the environment. Geographical conditions or basic 
characteristics of the economic structure of a Member State tend to be 
particularly relevant. For example, Germany and other Member States in the 
north-east of the EU generally tend to prefer uniform European emission 
standards over environmental quality standards because they suffer from 
transboundary pollution as a result of geographical and climatic factors. In 
contrast, the western Member States often prefer quality standards because they 
face considerably less transboundary pollution due to more favourable 
conditions (Golub 1996, 707-709). Uniform emission standards would have the 
effect of forcing these countries to comply with a relatively high level of 
environmental protection which responds to the needs of the more heavily 
polluted north-eastern Member States. The use of environmental quality 
standards allows such countries to fully benefit from their geographical and 
climatic advantages.
Ecological influences on Member State interests also result from differing 
economic structures. For example, due to heavy industrialisation many northern 
Member States have a stronger interest in combating industrial pollution than 
the less industrialised southern countries (Borzel 2001, 17-18; Holzinger 1994, 
77).
Political factors explain why environmental problems do not always lead 
to political responses. As a result of interests in preserving the status quo, 
institutional rigidities, insufficient resources and capacities etc. there is often a 
considerable mismatch between the degree of environmental pollution and the 




























































































frequently occurs in situations in which environmental pollution is relatively low 
or decreasing, while more severe environmental problems may receive less 
attention (Prittwitz 1990).
However, political influences may also be important in overcoming 
economic and other interests which mitigate against measures to protect the 
environment (Scharpf 1998, 129-132). Several factors, such as the party system, 
the presence of an environmental movement, influential environmental interest 
groups or parties, and wide-spread environmental consciousness all have an 
influence on whether and how environmental problems are translated into 
Member State interests. The German position at the EU level on the planned 
introduction of significantly stricter emission limits for large combustion plants 
and cars in the 1980s exemplifies the relevance of domestic politics. While such 
measures had previously been strictly opposed by the German government, the 
first electoral successes of the Green party fundamentally changed the German 
position (Boehmer-Christiansen/Skea 1991, Andersen 1997, 213; Sbragia 1996, 
248-249).
Economic factors play a major role in the formation of Member State 
interests. Scharpf supplemented his argument regarding the joint decision trap to 
incorporate factors which explain why certain EU environmental standards are 
relatively stringent. He distinguishes between environmental “product” and 
“process” standards. Regarding product standards, it is unlikely that European 
regulations reflect the lowest common denominator of Member State interests 
because the economic advantages of a single standard are an incentive for 
environmental latecomers to enter into a compromise with environmental 
pacesetters to achieve harmonisation, in particular in cases where the pacesetters 
control export markets important for the latecomers (cf. Scharpf 1994, 233- 
234).5
However, regarding process standards, there are usually only few 
economic incentives for latecomers to adjust their standards upwards because it 
is much more difficult for leader countries to keep goods which were produced 
subject to low process standards from entering their markets.6 On the contrary, if 
lower standards have a significant effect on production costs, economic 
competition may result in a “race to the bottom” where Member States compete 
for the lowest production standards in order to promote their industries (ibid., 
234-235; Scharpf 1998, 131-132).
Similarly, the debate about emission vs. quality standards is not only 
motivated by different levels of transboundary pollution but also by economic 
considerations. For example, British opposition to emission standards is to some 




























































































standards means that British industry is burdened with higher costs (Golub 1996, 
707-708). Conversely, Member States which have adopted, or plan to adopt, 
high emission standards have an economic interest in other countries adopting 
the same standards in order to prevent their own industries from becoming less 
economically competitive (Scharpf 1997, 20; Weizsàcker 1990, 44).
Finally, different levels of economic development also constitute an 
important influence on Member State interests in EU environmental policy. 
Although a high level of environmental protection may in the long term 
frequently be associated more with economic advantages than with higher costs 
(cf. OTA, 1994), the financial requirements of implementation can be sub­
stantial in the short and medium term. As a result, less economically developed 
countries tend to be latecomers which oppose the adoption of stringent 
environmental standards at the EU level (Scharpf 1996, 15; Sbragia 1996, 249; 
Holzinger 1994, 77). In fact, the poorer Member States, such as Portugal, Spain, 
Greece and Ireland, are usually counted as environmental latecomers (Bôrzel 
2001, 12-13).
National administrative traditions also shape Member States’ interests in 
EU environmental policy. German and British interests have so far been 
particularly strongly associated with the promotion and diffusion of these 
traditions. Administrative practices in these two countries are diametrically 
opposed with regard to the use of emission as opposed to quality standards, 
hierarchical substantive regulation as opposed to procedural self-regulation or 
formal as opposed to informal interest intermediation (Knill/Lenschow 1997, 1, 
5). These differences contributed to competition between these two countries to 
influence EU environmental policy.
More specifically, in the early 1980s successive German governments 
tried to “européanise” German environmental policy by means of political 
initiatives at the EU level and in other international organisations (Boehmer- 
Christiansen/Skea 1991, 193; Sbragia 1996, 240). In addition to an economic 
interest in avoiding competitive disadvantages for German industry due to more 
stringent environmental legislation in Germany, this strategy of “up-loading” of 
German environmental policy aimed at minimising the administrative 
adjustment costs which were expected to follow from European regulations 
(Héritier/Knill/Mingers 1996, 175-176; see also Zito 1999, 26). The “greening” 
of the German government in the early 1980s was followed by a similar 
development in the UK in the late 1980s (Golub 1996, 711). Britain copied the 
German strategy and managed to export its regulatory approach via the EU to 




























































































Diverse ecological, political, economic and administrative factors 
influence the formation of Member State interests in EU environmental policy. 
It has nevertheless been possible to identify several environmental pace-setters: 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden frequently 
support the adoption of stringent EU environmental legislation. With respect to 
these countries several conditions which tend to support an interest in high-level 
EU environmental protection converge. These factors include a high GDP, 
advanced industrialisation, high affectedness by transboundary and/or 
domestically caused pollution, wide-spread environmental consciousness, and 
relatively high domestic political relevance of environmental policy (cf. 
Holzinger 1994, 78-79). Conversely, factors supporting a Member State’s 
opposition to stringent EU environmental legislation -  e.g. a lower GDP, lower 
industrialisation and pollution levels etc. -  converge in the case of the 
environmental latecomers Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.
Interestingly, the UK -  until recently a latecomer -  differs from the rest of 
the group with regard to several factors. Britain’s initial reluctance to support 
high EU environmental standards may be attributed to its special geographical 
situation, particularly severe economic difficulties in the 1980s, and a regulatory 
approach which differs sharply from the German administrative tradition. 
However, the same factors may also explain why the UK has adopted a more 
constructive attitude towards EU environmental policy since the late 1980s: Not 
only has the economic situation drastically improved, but administrative 
requirements of EU environmental policy are much more similar to British 
administrative practice than they used to be.7
The remaining Member States -  e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, and 
Luxembourg -  either choose to support environmental pacesetters or latecomers 
on a case-by-case basis or opt for a medium level of EU environmental 
regulation (Holzinger 1994, 78).
The fact that Member States can be classified as environmental 
pacesetters and laggards does not in itself imply that the joint decision trap can 
be easily overcome, in particular because coalitions between pacesetters or 
latecomers are not permanent but have to be negotiated on an ad hoc basis 
(Liefferink/Andersen 1998, 264). The various factors which account for 
Member State interests in EU environmental policy merely suggest that the 
institutional self-interest in retaining decision-making powers at the national 
level may be offset by a host of other interests associated, in particular, with 





























































































Various institutional arrangements at the European level also contribute to 
overcoming the decision-making constraints of the joint decision trap.8 Highly 
complex institutions, such as the multi-level decision-making system of the EU 
(Marks 1993; Hooghe 1996), not only provide for veto points which enable 
actors to block decisions (Immergut 1992, 226-244) but also offer multiple 
channels for sufficiently resourceful and motivated actors to push their preferred 
solution through the decision-making system (Imbusch 2001, 5-9; Mazey/Rich- 
ardson 1993, 112; Peters 1992, 118). As pointed out by Héritier (1998, 4), the 
deadlock-prone formal decision-making system of the EU has developed more 
or less informal “second-order” institutions which allow actors to overcome 
deadlock. The ability of environmental pacesetters to exert disproportionate 
influence on EU environmental policy frequently depends on the availability of 
such channels.
The introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV) which covers more 
and more areas of environmental decision-making is generally seen as a 
particularly important factor in overcoming resistance by latecomers to stringent 
EU environmental legislation. However, even under QMV it is relatively easy 
for environmental latecomers to block legislative proposals by leader countries 
(Andersen 1997, 218). Moreover, if pacesetters are unable to form a blocking 
minority, they may even be forced to accept a legislative outcome which reflects 
the lowest common denominator of the interests of a coalition of latecomers and 
some of the neutral countries (Holzinger 1994, 466-468; Golub 1996a).
Several other institutional arrangements at the EU level further increase 
the influence of pacesetters. The Commission’s agenda setting power (cf. 
Pollack 1999) is an important factor. Due to the fact that the Commission has 
relatively few staff and lacks in-house expertise, it is heavily dependent on 
Member State experts in its numerous advisory committees 
(Héritier/Knill/Mingers 1996, 152-153). The Commission also employs 
temporary national experts, who are seconded from their home administrations. 
Member States frequently use this opportunity to "parachute" experts into 
strategic positions in the Commission to advance their domestic regulatory 
approach and standards (Liefferink/Andersen 1998).9 In addition, there are ef­
fective channels for Member States to submit written proposals for EU 
environmental legislation to the Commission, for example through the 
Environmental Policy Review Group (EPRG) in which high level Member State 




























































































These channels of access to the Commission would only be of relatively 
minor importance for environmental pacesetters if they were not coupled with a 
specific set of institutionally shaped preferences of the Commission. First, as the 
“motor of integration” the Commission has an institutional self-interest in 
expanding its regulatory competencies (Majone 1994, 31-33). It is therefore 
more likely to accept policy proposals by Member States if these proposals offer 
opportunities for an expansion of its competencies. Such proposals tend to come 
from highly regulated environmental pacesetters. In addition, the Commission is 
particularly receptive to proposals by Member States for stringent EU 
environmental legislation because it is afraid that corresponding legislation at 
the national level might have a negative impact on the Internal Market (Sbragia 
2000, 240).
In contrast, latecomers frequently try to block the adoption of EU environ­
mental legislation.10 Even if environmental latecomers are not principally op­
posed to the adoption of new legislation, they tend to prefer low environmental 
standards which leave little room for the Commission to positively influence 
environmental policy. This is particularly important in terms of the 
Commission’s second main institutional interest stemming from the strong 
functional sectoralisation of the Commission as an organisation (Peters 1992, 
117-119). In particular in the case of environmental policy, which cuts across 
other policy areas, sectoralisation leads to intensive competition and “turf 
battles” between DGs, each of which wants to maximise its influence. Member 
State proposals for environmental legislation are therefore more likely to be 
accepted by DG Environment if they reflect a relatively high standard of 
environmental protection, and thus concord with its own preferences, rather than 
with those of competing DGs which usually prefer lower standards 
(Peterson/Bomberg 1999, 189-192; Mazey/Richardson 1993, 121-122).
The institutional structure of the Council also offers opportunities for 
environmental pacesetters to push their legislative agenda. Leaders have used 
their respective Council presidencies to give their preferred policy proposals 
priority treatment on the Council agenda (Sbragia 1996, 247). Of course, laggard 
countries may equally use the presidency to delay discussion of environmental 
legislation. However, on balance, the gains in decision-making efficiency 
accruing from the agenda-setting power of the presidency should be expected to 
reduce non-decision-making, and work in favour of the adoption of environ­
mental legislation.
The functional differentiation of the Council provides pacesetters with 
particularly good opportunities to promote their policies. The Environment 
Council, which adopts most EU environmental legislation, is more sympathetic 




























































































Council. Perhaps more importantly, environment ministries, which generally 
tend to be relatively weak vis-a-vis other national ministries, may use the 
Environment Council to outmanoeuvre rival ministries in a “two-level game”. 
Given that national rivals are not represented on the Environment Council, 
environment ministries can promote stringent environmental legislation at the 
EU level, which they were unable to push through at the national level due to 
resistance by other ministries. This may explain why certain pieces of EU 
environmental legislation are more stringent than any pre-existing national 
legislation (Sbragia 1996, 247).
Environmental pacesetters frequently also command superior resources 
which they employ to exploit the institutional opportunities to influence EU 
policy-making (Borzel 2001, 7-8). The significance of expertise often works in 
their favour. In drafting legislation the Commission is assisted by advisory 
committees staffed with Member State experts. Interactions in these committees 
are shaped by legal and technical discussions (Majone 1994, 56-57). In the 
committee meetings representatives from environmental pacesetters frequently 
dominate deliberations because their countries tend to be more economically and 
technically advanced than the latecomers. Furthermore, they have frequently 
already gained extensive experience with environmental regulation in the field 
under discussion (cf. Eichner 1995; Andersen 1997, 222).
A similar logic applies to the institutional sub-structure of the Council. 
Discussions in the Council Working Group on Environment, which prepares the 
Council meetings, often include technical experts from national administrations. 
Ad hoc expert groups may also be established. Pacesetters, such as Denmark and 
Sweden, try to influence discussions in these bodies by providing well prepared 
substantive input (Liefferink/Andersen 1998,261-262). Nevertheless, in the case 
of the Council the overall influence on policy outcomes of discussions at the 
more technical level appear to be quite limited due to the dominant role of the 
political bodies, e.g. the Council and the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) (Andersen 1997, 221).
Finally, the European Parliament (EP) is an increasingly influential “green 
player” among the major EU institutions. Since the mid-1980s the legislative 
role of the EP in EU environmental policy has been strengthened in successive 
Treaty reforms. Not only do Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
generally appear to be more responsive to environmental concerns than their 
national counterparts, but the EP Environment Committee has managed to carve 
out an exceptionally influential role for itself in internal EP decision-making (cf. 
Judge/Eamshaw/Cowan 1994; Judge/Eamshaw 1992). Being in close contact 
with environmental NGOs and DG Environment, the Committee is part of what 




























































































In sum, the fact that Member States are not only motivated by their 
institutional self-interest in retaining competencies at the national level but also 
by a host of other ecological, political, economic, and administrative conditions 
increases the potential for reaching an agreement on common policies which 
exceeds the lowest common denominator. Environmental pacesetters have 
disproportionate influence on EU environmental policy-making as a result of 
various institutional factors. The most important of these factors are the 
accessibility of the Commission to input from Member State officials, the 
institutionally set preferences of the Commission, the “green” influence of the 
EP, strong sectoralisation of EU decision-making and, to a lesser degree, 
opportunities to influence policy-making at the European level on the basis of 
expertise and other resources.
Problems of Implementation
Although there is broad agreement among analysts that EU environmental 
policy suffers from a serious implementation deficit, little is known about the 
exact extent of the deficit. This may be attributed to at least two general factors: 
First, there is no agreement on how to define and measure the implementation 
deficit. While the Commission has developed detailed guidelines and indicators 
for the implementation of specific legal acts, including EU environmental 
legislation, it has not generalised the criteria which could determine when full 
implementation has been achieved. Consequently, it is difficult to compare and 
aggregate instances of implementation failure. One of the reasons for this is, that 
the Commission cannot interfere with the competencies of Member States, 
which are responsible for implementation (Nicolaides 1999, 23-24).
Second, there is a lack of information on the implementation of European 
legislation, in particular regarding practical implementation on the ground 
(McCormick 1994, 200; Collins and Eamshaw 1992, 236). When assessing 
implementation, the Commission focuses mainly on legal issues of transposition 
of European legislation into national legislation and on complaints from 
businesses and citizens about breaches of EU law, rather than on more 
systematic methods of inquiry (cf. EC 1999, 9; Nicolaides 1999, 24). This and 
other factors, such as the Commission’s difficulties in assessing whether 
complaints about practical implementation are justified,11 mean that the data 
provides only a very sketchy picture of the implementation of EU legislation 
(Jordan 1999a, 80-81).
Taking these limitations into account, the Commission’s data nevertheless 
convey the impression that the implementation deficit is particularly large in the 
environmental field (or, at least, that the Commission perceives the 




























































































significant). For example, in the Commission’s 1999 Report on Monitoring the 
Application of Community Law (EC 1999) the chapter on the environment takes 
up 37 pages. The second largest chapter -  on Internal Market legislation -  
counts 35 pages, while each of the remaining chapters has less than 10 pages. 
These figures are particularly striking given that the number of applicable 
environmental directives was 145, whereas at 745 the corresponding number for 
the Internal Market was almost five times higher. Although the number of 
directives in most sectoral policies was significantly smaller than in the 
environmental field, it should also be pointed out that the report only contains 
five pages on legislation concerning agriculture despite there being 398 
directives.
The number of times the Commission applied to the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) for penalties for failure to implement legislation also indicates that 
the Commission is particularly concerned about the implementation deficit of 
EU environmental legislation: Of fourteen ECJ judgements regarding penalties 
given up to December 1998, nine concerned environmental directives (EC 
1999).
Implementation problems arise at different stages of the process of 
implementing European law. First, EU directives might not be transposed 
correctly into national law (failure of legal transposition). Second, 
implementation might fail if the necessary administrative rules and institutional 
practices are not established (failure of administrative implementation). Finally, 
there might be a lack of technical, financial or personnel resources which 
hinders full application and enforcement (failure of practical application).12
The various stages at which implementation problems arise suggest that 
the implementation deficit has several causes. Legislation may be difficult to 
implement because it is incoherent and/or vague, reflecting the political 
compromises reached by Member States. Incoherence and/or vagueness may 
lead to problems of legal transposition or administrative implementation. Legis­
lation may also be difficult to implement practically. For example, there may be 
a lack of sufficiently qualified staff or the costs of implementation may have 
been underestimated. Insufficient consideration of implementation capacity 
sometimes results from the fact that the Commission, which drafts EU 
legislation, is not responsible for implementation, which falls to the Member 
States alone (cf. Jordan 1999a, 78-79). Majone (1994, 66) argues that “over­
regulation” results from this division of labour: Because the costs of 
implementation are borne by those who have to comply, rather than by the 




























































































It has also been argued that the fact that EU environmental legislation 
tends to reflect the preferences of environmental pacesetters may explain the 
implementation deficit. According to this view, the interests and administrative 
traditions of certain Member States are not sufficiently incorporated into EU 
environmental legislation. These countries are then more likely to cause 
implementation problems (Borzel 1999; see also Jordan 1999, 76-77). More 
specifically, the southern Member States often have a worse implementation 
record than their northern partners. These countries lack the financial and 
administrative resources which are needed for the practical application of the 
environmental standards championed by the pacesetters. In addition, domestic 
supporters of environmental protection, such as non-govemmental organisations 
(NGOs) or industries which gain from the application of stringent standards tend 
to be weak in these countries (Borzel 1999).13 
Regulatory reform
In the late 1980s the implementation deficit received growing attention 
from the Commission (cf. Jordan 1999a, 76-77) which adjusted its regulatory 
approach. The adoption of the 1992 Fifth Environmental Action Programme 
marked a turning point (cf. Héritier/Knill/Mingers 1996, 162). As a legislative 
framework for European environmental policy was firmly in place, the 
Commission proclaimed a new phase of consolidating the legislative 
achievements. To improve the implementation record, the Commission proposed 
involving national, sub-national and societal actors more strongly in the process 
of implementation (“partnership”), improving the quality of, and access to, 
environmental information, simplifying legislation, and using more flexible 
regulatory instruments (EC 1996, 3). These measures were expected to reduce 
implementation costs while increasing the adaptability of legislation to local 
conditions and needs (cf. Knill/Lenschow 1999, 597).
In the following years several institutions were created which contributed 
to implementing the action programme. These include the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) to improve the quality of information, the EPRG, 
the European Consultative Forum for the Environment and Sustainable 
Development, comprising various societal actors, and the Implementation 
Network for European Environmental Legislation (IMPEL) as a forum for 
national enforcement agencies.
The Commission also developed more flexible regulatory instruments 
based on procedural requirements and self-regulation. Directives on access to 
environmental information and environmental impact assessment established 
new procedural requirements; Legislation on environmental management and 
audit systems (EMAS) and eco-labelling aims at creating incentives for self­




























































































framework directives which are based on an integrated view of environmental 
problems. These directives allow for more flexible implementation, taking local 
conditions and interdependencies between environmental problems into account. 
They also combine emission standards and the requirement of Best Available 
Technique (BAT) -  a more flexible version of the older concept of Best 
Available Technology -  with quality standards and procedural requirements. 
The Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive and the Water 
Framework Directive exemplify this approach (cf. Scott 2000; Hey 2000; 
Matthews 1999).
While it may still be too early to judge whether the new regulatory 
approach has improved the overall effectiveness of European environmental 
policy, hopes that the new regulations would reduce implementation problems 
because of increased flexibility have so far been disappointed. Some Member 
States, such as Germany, have severe difficulties in implementing flexible 
directives which conform more to traditional British than to German 
administrative practices. In addition, partly motivated by problems of 
administrative implementation, some Member States have abused flexibility to 
circumvent or water down European requirements (Borzel 2000, 35; 
Knill/Lenschow 1999).
Although the implementation deficit was one of the reasons why the 
Commission proposed a new regulatory approach, other factors were relevant, 
too. The Fifth Environmental Action Programme also reflected more 
fundamental concerns about the adequacy of traditional regulatory instruments 
to achieve sustainable development, about cost effectiveness, and about the 
centralisation of decision-making in Brussels. In conjunction with 
implementation problems, these concerns gave rise to the call for integration of 
environmental concerns into sectoral policies.
Environmental Integration
The compatibility of environmental protection with economic development and 
democracy was widely discussed at national and international levels in the late 
1980s. The issue came up forcefully in the context of the rise of global 
environmental problems, such as climate change and the loss of biodiversity. It 
became increasingly necessary to consider how these problems could be solved 
without sacrificing economic development and democracy, in particular in 
developing countries. A preliminary answer was given in the Brundtland Report, 




























































































The Fifth Environmental Action Programme reflected these debates and 
applied them to the European context (Baker 1997, 96-98). The Commission 
recognised that a more preventive strategy was needed, allowing curative “end- 
of-pipe” measures to be replaced by the integration of environmental concerns 
into the sectors which cause environmental problems, such as industry, 
agriculture, transport (Weizsacker 1990, 223-235). Not least the extended 
political struggles of the 1980s over legislation to combat air pollution by pre­
scribing end-of-pipe solutions - catalytic converters or desulphurisation techno­
logy (Boehmer-Christiansen/Skea 1991; Holzinger 1994) - had demonstrated 
that curative measures were too expensive as a basis for a practicable European 
approach to environmental policy. In particular for the economically and techno­
logically less developed Member States the existing approach had proved 
politically untenable. The EU had therefore been forced to allow these countries 
to temporarily derogate from certain particularly expensive directives.14 In 
addition to these measures, the Cohesion Fund was partly established as a 
redistributive instrument to support the large investment in the environmental 
infrastructure of the four poorest Member States which were necessary to 
practically implement EU environmental legislation in these countries (Borzel 
2001, 13)
In addition to the relationship between environmental protection and 
economic development, the Action Programme also dealt with the issues of 
participation and democracy. In the EU discussion of these issues not only 
coincided with, but was also to some extent substantively linked to, political 
efforts to promote and apply the principle of subsidiarity. In the first half of the 
1990s the UK, Germany and Denmark invoked the subsidiarity principle 
enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty to complain that the EU undermined the 
legitimate competencies of Member States and regions. On this view, 
environmental policy was dictated by Brussels and certain competencies should 
therefore be “renationalised” (Collier 1996, 12).
Whereas some Member States used the subsidiarity principle to argue for 
a return of EU competencies to the national level, the Action Programme gives a 
different, more participatory interpretation. It quotes Article A of the Maastricht 
Treaty, stating the aim of creating an ever closer union “in which decisions are 
taken as closely as possible to the citizen” (EC 1993, 78). The programme 
apparently took this aim to mean that the subsidiarity principle should be 
embedded within a broader concept of “shared responsibility”, according to 
which various state and societal actors, such as Member State authorities and 
regional governments, the business sector, the general public and consumers, 




























































































Despite the fact that sustainable development has become the official 
guiding principle of EU environmental policy and - according to Article 2 TEU 
and Article 2 TEC - is now one of the principal aims of the Union, only Article 6 
TEC contains statements which may be read as an operational definition of 
sustainable development (Kraemer/Mazurek 1999, 5-6; see also EC 1998, 3). 
The article calls for the integration of environmental concerns into the 
formulation and implementation of sectoral policies to achieve sustainable 
development. It may be interpreted as a requirement to promote integration at 
three different levels: in the societal and administrative spheres, and in the field 
of political decision-making.
Sustainable development requires direct integration of environmental 
concerns into economic activities through technical and social innovation. The 
European Auto-Oil Programme, which was launched in 1993 and is now in its 
second phase, exemplifies aspects of societal integration. It takes a long-term 
approach to the problem of car emissions. The aim is to achieve a reduction of 
emissions by 70 per cent by 2010. The programme focuses on the establishment 
of a scientific basis for determining the extent to which emissions of pollutants 
should be reduced and on elaborating the most efficient ways to achieve the 
necessary reductions (EC n.d.)
Initially, the Environment, Industry and Energy Directorates General and 
the European associations of car manufacturers (ACEA) and of the oil industry 
(EUROPIA) co-operated in the implementation of the programme. As there is a 
close interdependence between technologies to reduce car emissions, such as 
catalytic converters, and the improvement of fuel quality, participation by the 
respective industrial sectors was crucial. Additional actors -  e.g. other relevant 
industries, NGOs, Member State representatives, and research institutes -  have 
been included in the second phase of the programme. Elaborating reduction 
strategies on the basis of scientific expertise and in co-operation with producers 
-  other stakeholders function mainly as “watchdogs” -  the Auto-Oil Programme 
aims at ensuring that environmental concerns are fed into the long term technical 
development of the affected industries.15
Initiatives to create a European Integrated Product Policy (IPP) also 
attempt to improve societal integration. The Commission has recently published 
a Green Paper on IPP (EC 2001a). According to the document, IPP aims, among 
other things, at encouraging "life-cycle thinking", stimulating consumer demand 
for environmentally friendly products, and establishing “product panels” in 





























































































The second aspect of environmental integration is closely linked to 
implementation problems and flexible regulations. The fact that the Commission 
increasingly uses framework directives which cover a wide range of 
environmental problems and regulatory instruments and allow for more flexible 
implementation reflects efforts to improve administrative integration. The IPPC 
Directive is a particularly important example because it seeks to integrate a wide 
range of diverse directives listed in its annexes into a single licensing procedure. 
It also combines different instruments, such as emission standards, BAT, quality 
standards, delegation of decision making, public information and participation. 
This broadly based approach aims at a better integration of sectoral economic, 
technical, local, and grass-roots concerns into administrative decision-making 
(Scott 2000).
As pointed out above, flexible regulations have frequently been as 
difficult to implement as traditional regulations, mainly because of specific ad­
ministrative requirements or lack of support for effective implementation. If 
administrative integration is to enhance implementation it may therefore often 
be necessary to improve societal integration, too, in order to create some of the 
pre-conditions for an effective implementation of flexible regulations. The Auto- 
Oil Programme is a case in point. The programme led to the adoption of new, 
significantly more stringent, but also more flexible regulations for fuels. For ex­
ample, the 1998 Directive on the Quality of Petrol and Diesel Fuels contains 
temporally and substantively flexible requirements, allowing a Member State to 
delay full compliance if it can demonstrate that otherwise “severe difficulties 
would ensue for its industries” (Article 3). The directive also permits adoption 
of stricter standards in certain regions if “atmospheric pollution [...] can reason­
ably be expected to constitute a serious and recurrent problem” (Article 6(1)). 
The Auto-Oil Programme complements the directive by signalling to industry in 
countries which invoke the temporary derogation that companies will be 
expected to comply with even stricter standards in the near future. Industry 
therefore has an incentive to use the time gained as a result of the derogation to 
introduce the necessary changes. In turn, this adaptive behaviour reduces the 
risk of implementation deficits.
The third dimension of integration concerns political decision-making 
structures. Reform of the institutional foundations of decision-making is 
necessary if less radical efforts to deal with environmental problems are 
insufficient. As mentioned in the introduction, despite the adoption of stringent 
EU environmental legislation, the overall state of the environment has not 
improved. Given the limited success of "softer" instruments, political 
integration has gained in importance in recent years. Calling on the Transport, 
Agriculture, and Energy Councils to prepare reports on the integration of 




























































































European Summit in Cardiff initiated the so-called Cardiff Process which so far 
remains the most important effort to implement the environmental integration 
requirement of Article 6. Subsequent European Councils also asked the 
Development, Industry, Internal Market, Ecofin, General Affairs, and Fisheries 
Councils to report on, and present strategies to improve, environmental 
integration.
However, the Cardiff Process is only a first step towards environmental 
integration. First, the sectoral reports need further refinement as they are not 
based on a common approach, differ in quality, and have no sufficient strategic 
component, such as concrete quantitative targets and timetables. Second, the 
reports must be implemented. Among other things, this may require the 
development and refinement of general and detailed guidelines and indicators 
for integration, the setting-up of reporting and review mechanisms, the 
establishment of a secretariat to co-ordinate and support integration activities, 
the formation of cross-sectoral working groups etc. Third, the Cardiff Process 
only deals with the Council. However, to effectively promote political 
integration other EU institutions, such as the Commission and the EP, must also 
take systematic action (Fergusson et al. 2001).
The Commission has established diverse mechanisms for environmental 
integration, but progress differs significantly among the services. Mechanisms 
include special units dedicated to environment in several DGs, the Joint 
Working Group under the European Climate Change Programme and the Expert 
Group on Transport and Environment (ibid., Annex 5; see also EC 1998). In 
addition to considerable further efforts by the sectoral services, institutional 
integration also requires major changes in DG Environment which “will have a 
new role in assisting, pushing and monitoring the progress [of environmental 
integration]” (EC 1999a, 8).
The Impact of Enlargement
The improvement of the state of the environment in the Accession Countries 
will form an integral part of EU environmental policy in an enlarged Union. In 
addition to the three characteristics of EU environmental policy, an assessment 
of the consequences of enlargement must therefore also take the environmental 
situation, and in particular future environmental trends, in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) into account. Enlargement is in many respects a challenge to EU 
environmental policy. Nevertheless, it also offers important environmental 
opportunities (Carius/Homeyer/Bar 2000, 146-147) and, as argued below, an 





























































































The state of the environment in CEE is still characterised by a sharp 
contrast between heavily polluted so-called environmental hot-spots and large, 
unspoilt areas possessing a rich biodiversity (EEA 1998, 149; REC 1994, 10). 
This situation can mostly be attributed to the way in which the system of central 
planning operated in the era of communist rule. The population and industrial 
production, in particular heavy industries, were concentrated in a small number 
of regions close to cheap -  and often “dirty” -  sources of energy. At the same 
time, many areas between these agglomerations remained relatively untouched. 
Similarly, although CEECs were plagued by severe industrial pollution, 
environmental degradation caused by environmentally harmful consumption 
patterns was relatively low.
Since the political upheaval of the late 1980s and early 1990s there has 
been a clear trend towards convergence between environmental conditions in the 
EU and in CEECs. While this has brought considerable improvements to the 
environmental hot spots, convergence accentuates the challenge of sustainable 
development in that “CEECs could end up making the same mistakes as the 
west after the west has made them” (T&E 2000). Given that in the years ahead 
economic growth in CEECs is expected to be significantly higher than in present 
EU Member States, it seems reasonable to assume that CEECs will increasingly 
suffer from the same environmental trends which already pose the most 
challenging problems for EU environmental policy, for example environmental 
degradation caused by sharply increasing road traffic. Therefore, the challenge 
and the opportunity for EU environmental policy is to limit, as far as possible, 
the tendency towards convergence in those areas where convergence results in a 
repetition of developments which are presently recognised in the EU as 
unsustainable.16
The general framework of EU environmental policy-making in which 
many of the relevant decisions will be made is characterised by the leader- 
laggard dynamic, the implementation deficit, and the ongoing efforts to promote 
sustainable development by integrating environmental concerns into sectoral 
policies. Against this background I argue, first, that to retain the dynamic 
development of EU environmental policy as a pre-condition for successful 
environmental policy-making and to prevent a growing implementation deficit 
after enlargement, it will be necessary to further increase the flexibility of EU 
environmental legislation. Second, such a strategy will only be successful in the 
longer run if the EU also increases its efforts to assist CEECs, in particular in 
creating effective structures for the integration of environmental concerns into 
sectoral policies. Third, although EU assistance helps the Accession Countries to 
implement the environmental acquis, environmental integration has so far been 




























































































The main ecological, political, economic, and administrative factors which 
shape Member States’ interests in EU environmental policy predominantly 
suggest that most CEECs will belong to the group of latecomers after accession. 
This holds, in particular, for economic and political factors. Although economic 
growth rates in CEECs will probably be higher than in present Member States, it 
will nevertheless take decades for the Accession Countries to catch up. This is 
particularly true for the least economically developed applicants, such as 
Bulgaria and Romania (Chalmers 2000, 24). The future Member States may 
therefore be expected to be less willing to bear the short and medium term costs 
of a high level of environmental protection.
Despite the wave of environmental reforms in the early 1990s in most 
Accession Countries, today environmental protection ranks low on the political 
agenda in CEE, where economic and social problems of transition tend to 
dominate politics (Baker/Jehlicka 1998, 9-11). Even the fact that several of the 
wealthier Accession Countries spend a significantly larger share of their GDP on 
environmental pollution abatement than most western European countries do 
(OECD 1999, 130) offers little consolation for environmental pacesetters. This 
higher spending can be attributed, first, to particularly severe environmental 
problems caused by the legacy of environmental damage and a still relatively 
large share of unsustainable production technologies which these countries have 
inherited from the past and, second, to external pressure, in particular from the 
EU in the context of accession. The second factor is underlined by the fact that 
the EU has repeatedly stressed that it expects Accession Countries not only to 
have completed the formal transposition of EU environmental legislation into 
national law by the date of accession but, also, to be able to effectively apply 
and enforce the respective requirements. The EU declared that it will only 
accept transitional periods for the practical implementation of EU environmental 
legislation in well-defined, exceptional cases.17
These basic conditions suggest that with respect to economic and political 
factors, the situation in the Accession Countries resembles the one in the 
environmental latecomers Greece, Spain and Portugal at the time when these 
countries joined the EU. In some of the poorest Accession Countries the degree 
of economic development is in fact significantly lower than it was in the three 
southern Member States (Chalmers 2000, 24).
In the short and medium term, administrative problems also abound. 
Accession Countries lack administrative capacities to implement and enforce 
European environmental legislation, in particular at the local and regional levels. 





























































































expected to improve. The Accession Countries’ own efforts to meet the 
requirements of the EU and EU assistance, in particular through the Phare 
institutional capacity building programme, are likely to lead to significant 
improvements. Perhaps more importantly, the CEECs are still going through a 
process of economic and political transformation. This ongoing process, coupled 
with the need to adapt to EU requirements, may create exceptional opportunities 
to overcome the institutional rigidities which usually tend to stifle administrative 
reforms (cf. Soil and Water Ltd. 1999, 61-69). Despite the lack of administrative 
capacities in Accession Countries, resistance to the introduction of more flexible 
regulations may therefore be weaker than in some of the old Member States, 
such as Germany. The fact that in the aftermath of the wave of political reforms 
in the early 1990s several CEECs adopted procedural regulations on public 
access to environmental information and environmental impact assessment - in 
some cases even “strategic” environmental assessment of plans and policies - 
may also be helpful (cf. Caddy 1998). In addition, most Accession Countries 
already made use of environmental charges and taxes in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Klarer/Lehoczki 1999, 33). It remains to be seen to which extent these 
traditions will help to outweigh the lack of administrative capacities.
While administrative factors are, if anything, only likely to contribute in 
the medium to long term to the emergence of a more accommodating position of 
Accession Countries on high EU environmental standards, ecological influences 
may in certain countries be expected to do so sooner. Regarding ecological 
factors, it seems useful to distinguish between those Accession Countries which 
are strongly affected by problems of transboundary pollution and border on 
present environmental pacesetters and the remaining Accession Countries for 
which these criteria do not apply. All things being equal, the first group is 
obviously more likely to develop an interest in higher EU environmental 
standards than the second. First, transboundary pollution can often be reduced 
more effectively by a European than by bi- or multinational efforts. The interests 
of individual Accession Countries in higher common standards are, however, 
likely to vary according to the predominant kind of transboundary pollution. For 
example, Hungary suffers considerably more from transboundary water than 
from transboundary air pollution (cf. OECD 2000, 129-132). Second, even if 
transboundary pollution is not a serious problem, the fact that a particular 
country borders on a pacesetter may create political incentives - for example, in 
terms of bilateral financial and technical assistance or more general efforts to 
improve the political climate - for this country to support a higher level of 
environmental protection than it would otherwise have opted for.
With the exception of Romania and Bulgaria, all Central and Eastern 
European Accession Countries have something approaching a common border 




























































































directly share a border with these countries, they do border on the Baltic Sea. 
Against the background that some environmental pacesetters, in particular 
Sweden and Denmark, pursue a very active environmental policy to protect the 
Baltic Sea (Haas 1993), these countries may have a similar influence on the 
Baltic States as if they actually shared a border with them.
In addition, the ecological challenges which the Accession Countries have 
to confront are, in general, more similar to those of the northern European 
pacesetters than to those of the southern latecomers. Unlike the southern 
Member States, the Accession Countries have a long history of severe industrial 
pollution which may increase their support for the adoption of relatively 
stringent environmental standards at the European level.
This cursory review of the factors which are likely to influence the 
interests of Accession Countries suggests that most Accession Countries would 
tend to oppose a high level of environmental protection once they became 
members of the EU. Economic, political, and, at least in the short and medium 
term, administrative factors account for this hypothesis. Ecological and certain 
geographical aspects - in particular affectedness by transboundary pollution, 
geographical proximity to environmental pacesetters, and severe environmental 
problems which are qualitatively similar to those of the pacesetters - may 
somewhat compensate for the mostly negative impact of political, economic and 
administrative factors.
If a group of countries which frequently adopts positions that are close to 
those of the present environmental latecomers, joined the EU,18 the leader- 
laggard dynamic should be expected to suffer. Under these conditions, it would 
be significantly easier for a growing group of latecomers to block EU legislation 
aiming at a high level of environmental protection. Latecomers could also 
succeed more easily in getting lax EU environmental standards adopted. Finally, 
it would generally be more difficult to agree on decisions at the EU level at all 
due to the dramatic increase in the number and diversity of Member States as a 
result of enlargement (Homeyer/Carius/Bar 2000, 357).
However, whether enlargement will actually undermine the leader-laggard 
dynamic does not entirely depend on the interests and the number of Member 
States. Environmental pacesetters already are a minority in a Community of 
fifteen Member States. Their disproportionate influence on EU environmental 
policy to a considerable extent results from their superior resources and 
capacities and from the fact that they benefit from the institutional 
characteristics of the Union and the availability of secondary institutional 
channels to promote their interests. It is extremely difficult to predict the effects 




























































































complexity of European decision-making which is likely to result from a larger 
number of Member States, may lead to additional co-ordination problems. 
Consequently, the insulation of environmental policy-making from rival 
interests may grow. As argued above, so far the adoption of stringent 
environmental standards seems to have benefited from relatively strong 
insulation of environmental policy-making at the EU level. On the other hand, 
efforts to limit the number of Commissioners and to centralise decision-making 
within the Commission may lead to an increasing hierarchy among Commission 
services which is likely to reduce the relative influence of DG Environment.19
On balance, it seems difficult to prevent enlargement from reducing 
decision-making efficiency and undermining the leader-laggard dynamic, given 
the factors mentioned above and the simple but highly important fact that the 
number of EU Member States will increase by two thirds when all ten Central 
and Eastern European Accession Countries have joined the Union. In 
anticipation of the resulting problems, the option of flexible integration has 
increasingly been discussed in recent years. More specifically, the Amsterdam 
Treaty introduced the possibility for a group of Member States to use the 
European institutions to engage in Closer Co-operation (now: Enhanced Co­
operation). Although the respective provisions have not been applied so far, they 
have already been amended by the Nice Treaty, in particular by abolishing the 
de facto veto right which individual Member States held so far. At least eight 
Member States may under certain conditions agree on common measures which 
are more far-reaching than existing Community legislation but are only binding 
for those Member States which participate in that particular instance of co­
operation. DG Environment has already considered the possibility that Enhanced 
Co-operation may be usefully employed by environmental pacesetters to 
forestall stagnation of EU environmental policy as a result of enlargement (EC, 
1999b, 46. See also Bar/Homeyer/Klasing 2001; Bar et al. 2000).
Enhanced Co-operation can help to preserve the leader-laggard dynamic 
after enlargement. More specifically, there appear to be several incentives for 
the “outs” which do not initially take part in an instance of Enhanced Co­
operation employing more stringent environmental standards to join at a later 
stage. Although those Member States which do not take part in an Enhanced Co­
operation may in some cases enjoy an economic competitive advantage vis-a-vis 
the participants, the reverse may frequently also be true. For example, the 
members of an Enhanced Co-operation could become technological and 
institutional pace-setters who have the opportunity to unilaterally determine the 
standards and procedures with which the non-members would have to comply 
once they decided to increase their level of environmental protection. In this 
case the “outs” would have little choice but to join the Enhanced Co-operation 




























































































level by the Commission and the founding members of the Enhanced Co­
operation.
In other cases purely domestic incentives for the non-members to adopt 
higher standards may be permanently too weak. However, even in these cases 
there appears to be a high probability that the “outs” would eventually join an 
existing Enhanced Co-operation. First, the Commission has a strong interest in 
preventing permanently differing standards between groups of Member States 
and may therefore propose measures to assist the latecomers in catching up. 
Second, Member States already participating in an Enhanced Co-operation may 
also have an interest in assisting the non-members to join, in particular if joining 
would contribute to the elimination of an economic competitive advantage for 
the non-members. Finally, in certain cases, for example if it seems likely that the 
members of an Enhanced Co-operation would benefit from first mover 
advantages, environmental pacesetters may use the option of establishing an 
Enhanced Co-operation merely as a threat to induce latecomers to agree to 
common higher standards.
Implementation Problems
Enlargement could also increase the implementation deficit of EU 
environmental legislation. The findings of the Commission’s 1999 Screening of 
the compatibility of the environmental legislation of Accession Countries with 
EU requirements (for example: EC 1999c), the Commission’s annual reports on 
progress towards accession (for example: EC 2000), and the documents 
prepared for the accession negotiations in the field of the environment (for 
example, Government of the Czech Republic 1999; Council of the European 
Union 1999) highlight many implementation problems.
Severe difficulties exist at each stage of implementation. In most 
Accession Countries the process of legal transposition has been significantly 
slower than expected. More importantly, the applicants lack administrative and 
financial resources to effectively apply and enforce environmental legislation on 
the ground. Except for Poland the negotiations on the environmental chapter of 
the acquis were provisionally closed with the five most advanced so called 
Luxembourg Countries in spring 2001. The Table (below) shows the transitional 
periods for which the Luxembourg Countries applied during the accession 
negotiations. In the Table bold dates indicate those transitional arrangements on 
which these countries and the EU agreed. The Table illustrates the fact that if the 
Luxembourg Countries joined the EU according to their own ambitious plans in 
2003, they would need several transitional periods of up to twelve years until 
they were capable of fully applying and enforcing central pieces of EU en­




























































































Directive (UWWTD), the IPPC Directive, and various items of waste legis­
lation.
There are at least three major underlying problems which give rise to the 
need for transitional arrangements in the environmental field. First, the 
Accession Countries do not have sufficient financial resources for the practical 
application of EU environmental legislation. Recent assessments estimate the 
costs for implementing the environmental acquis at a total of 80-110 billion 
Euro. Thirteen directives dealing with water, air, and industrial pollution and 
with waste disposal have been identified as being responsible for most of the 
heavy investment needs (EC 2001, 6-7). Among these, implementation of the 
UWWTD is by far the most costly requirement. The directive requires the 
extension of sewerage systems and waste water treatment facilities. As indicated 
in the Table, all Luxembourg Countries request transitional periods for some 
requirements of the directive. For example, the costs of implementing the 
UWWTD in the Czech Republic are estimated at 1,9 billion Euro. The Czech 
Government has requested a transitional period until 2010. However, it seems 
questionable whether the country will be able to fully implement the directive by 
that time. According to a study commissioned by the World Bank, a ..further 
expansion of the accession period and deadlines up to 2016-2017 will most 
probably be needed" (Carl Bro et al. 1999, 150) because sharply rising water 
prices would otherwise result in socially unacceptable costs for private 
households, industry, and agriculture (cf. ibid., 126). Slovenian plans to 
implement the UWWTD may therefore be more realistic. Despite the fact that 
Slovenia has the highest per capita income of all Accession Countries, it 
originally applied for a particularly long transitional period until 2017 which has 
now been reduced to 2015.
Although the implementation costs for the “expensive” environmental 
directives, such as the UWWTD and the IPPC-Directive, are certainly high, it 
should be kept in mind that the costing assessments prepared so far are fraught 
with methodological and other difficulties and differ in their findings (EC 2001, 
7; Carius et al. 2000, 161-162; Soil and Water Ltd. 2000, 63). Moreover, the 
economic significance of the investment needs differs sharply between the 
Accession Countries: Whereas a “rich” Accession Country, such as the Czech 
Republic, will have to spend about 2% of its annual GDP on environmental 
investment, the figure for less wealthy Bulgaria is estimated at 11% (World 
Bank 2000, 8).
The lack of effective administrative structures in the Accession Countries 
poses a second major problem for implementing and enforcing environmental 
legislation. This holds, in particular, for the environmental inspectorates 




























































































and regional authorities, and in some cases even for environment ministries 
themselves. Institutional arrangements, such as the division of competencies, are 
insufficient and there is a lack of resources, such as qualified staff and technical 
equipment (OECD 1999, 64; EEA 1999, 401). However, due to the EU 
approach to the accession negotiations, these problems are often not reflected in 
the requests for transitional periods. According to the EU, transitional 
arrangements may only be justified on political or economic grounds. For 
example, transitional periods are admissible where huge investment is needed to 
implement the acquis, direct payments are to be made to farmers under the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), or where the free movement of persons 
within the Union is concerned. By contrast, transitional periods will not usually 
be granted for difficulties of administrative implementation.
Against this background it seems highly questionable whether the 
transitional periods agreed with the Luxembourg Countries -  as illustrated in the 
Table, the number of which is much lower than the original applications20 -  
reflect a realistic assessment of the limited capacities to implement EU 
environmental legislation, both in financial and in administrative terms. There is 
a risk that, rather than promoting effective implementation on the ground, an 
overly restrictive approach to the accession negotiations may have the opposite 
effect because Accession Countries may be left with little choice but to erect 
“Potemkin-village” -like organisational structures to prevent further delays in 
the accession process as a result of their difficulties in implementing EU 
environmental legislation. These pretend arrangements would allow the 
applicants and the EU alike to maintain that the requirements for accession had 
been fulfilled although, in fact, the Accession Countries would still not have the 
administrative capacities necessary to practically apply the environmental 
acquis. Efforts by some Accession Countries to get ex ante approval for specific 
ways of implementing EU environmental legislation may therefore not only re­
flect uncertainty concerning implementation requirements but could also be 
motivated by the wish to minimise ex post monitoring by the Commission which 

















































































































































i Abstraction of Drinking Water (75/440/EEC) - - 1
2/2010 [bl





INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION AND RISK MANAGEMENT










Air Pollution from Industrial Plants (84/360/EEC) - - 1
0/2007 [bl
- -
l Large Combustion Plants (88/609/EEC) - - 1
2/2004 [e]
“
CHEMICALS AND GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS (GMOs)






l Ozone Depleting Substances (EC/3093/94) “ “ 1
2/2005 [hi











Waste Framework (75/442/EEC) - - - 2
012 [bl
“
Hazardous Waste (91/689/EEC) - - 2
012 [bl
-
















Shipment of Waste (EEC/259/93) - - - 1
2/2012
“
Disposal of Waste Oils (75/439/EEC) “ 1
2/2005 [b]
“
As of June 2001 Bold dates: Transition periods provisionally agreed.
[a] Chapter provisionally closed.
[b] Recently withdrawn during the accession negotiations.
[c] Slovenia had originally applied for a transitional period until 12/2017.
[d] Hungary seeks to apply a different cut-off-date. This would result in a permanent derogation from certain 
requirements for certain installations.
[e] Hungary had applied for a transitional period until 12/2008.
[f] Estonia had applied for a transitional period until 12/2013.
[g] Estonia had applied for a transitional period until 1/2007.
[h] Withdrawal of the request for a transitional period in respect of methyl bromide, maintenance of the request 
in respect of HCFCs and CFCs.
[i] Withdrawal of the request for a transitional period in respect of heavy metal contents, maintenance of the 




























































































In contrast, if transitional periods were considered for administratively 
challenging directives, incentives and opportunities for this kind of “cheating” 
could be reduced. Pressure on Accession Countries to demonstrate compliance 
at the date of accession would be less severe. In addition, the Commission 
would be in a position to argue that it should retain its present special 
responsibilities for monitoring and supporting implementation beyond the date 
of accession in those cases in which transitional periods were granted. Such an 
approach might significantly reduce the long term risk of an increasing imple­
mentation deficit following enlargement.
The third factor that is in the way of an effective implementation of the 
environmental acquis is the fact that environmental NGOs and other societal 
actors which could politically support and assist implementation are only weakly 
developed in most Accession Countries (cf. OECD 1999, 81-102). In particular, 
they lack a strong domestic base in terms of membership, financial resources, 
and societal attitudes (Jehlicka 1999). Although this is not directly relevant for 
fulfilling EU requirements, it is nevertheless important for assessing future 
implementation problems. For example, similar factors contribute to 
implementation problems in some of the southern Member States (Borzel 1999).
If the Accession Countries do not fully implement the environmental 
acquis -  or do so only after long transition periods -  this may create economic 
and political incentives for the economically weaker present Member States to 
reduce their efforts to implement EU environmental legislation, too. Such a 
development could seriously undermine the political credibility of EU 
environmental policy. This could eventually lead to a partial “renationalisation” 
of environmental policy-making (Homeyer/Carius/Bar 2000, 358).
However, it remains difficult to predict the eventual effects of transitional 
periods and incomplete implementation. In particular, although financial and 
other capacities pose the biggest challenges in the short to medium term, the 
degree to which the Accession Countries will be able to implement EU 
environmental policies also depends on the way in which European 
requirements affect country specific formal and informal institutional 
configurations, which, in turn, shape the interests, opportunity structures and 
modes of interaction of relevant political, administrative and societal actors (cf. 
Borzel/Risse 2000; Haverland 2000; Heritier/Knill 2000). As mentioned above, 
these configurations are still in a flux as a result of the ongoing processes of 
transformation and accession in CEECs. For example, the Czech Republic, 
Poland and other Accession Countries are promoting decentralisation of 
decision-making, which could result in the creation of additional veto points in 




























































































Countries the legal transposition of EU legislation has been hampered by a 
highly politicised process of parliamentary ratification of legislation which 
resulted in the adoption of laws that failed to conform to European 
requirements.21 Yet, adversarial legislative decision-making may decrease once 
the new democracies grow older and manage to develop more consensual norms 
(cf. Kielminiski 1998, 15). While additional veto points at the regional level 
could lead to increasing difficulties in adapting to EU requirements, the 
emergence of more consensual decision-making norms would probably have the 
opposite effect.
Another factor that is likely to influence the long-term political 
repercussions of transitional periods and incomplete implementation is the state 
of implementation in the present Member States which constitutes an important 
political yardstick to assess the performance of the Accession Countries. Serious 
implementation problems in the Member States suggest that, at the date of 
accession, implementation could in certain cases in fact be more advanced in the 
Accession Countries than in many Member States. For example, all Member 
States have so far failed to fully legally transpose - not to mention to practically 
implement - important provisions of the Habitats Directive, although the 
deadline for transposition was 1994 (WWF 2001).
Finally, the effect of implementation problems in the Accession Countries 
on EU environmental policy also depends on future developments at the EU 
level. If, as seems likely, the EU will address the problems caused by the 
increasing diversity and differences in political priorities and implementation 
capacities among the Member States by further increasing the flexibility of its 
regulatory approach, potential pressure to “renationalise” EU environmental 
policy might be reduced (Homeyer/Carius/Bar 2000, 363-366)
Environmental Integration
The EU has reacted to a deteriorating state of the environment resulting, 
in particular, from “new” environmental problems with initiatives to integrate 
environmental concerns into sectoral policies. If these efforts were successful 
and could be transferred to the Accession Countries, it might be possible to 
preserve many environmentally favourable conditions in CEE - such as a high 
level of biodiversity and an environmentally friendly split between alternative 
modes of transport - by avoiding some of the mistakes committed in the present 
Member States.
Given the limited organisational and administrative resources in the 
Accession Countries at societal and state levels, co-ordination between different 
sectoral actors to achieve environmental integration may, however, be 




























































































by the fact that many Accession Countries have a long tradition of bureaucratic 
policy-making which is characterised by intense rivalries among and between 
ministries and branches of government (Carius et al. 2000a, 98-103).
Despite these obstacles, the process of joining the EU, in conjunction with 
the ongoing transition process, may have opened a window of opportunity to 
promote environmental integration at the societal, administrative and political 
levels. Accession leads to the adoption of more effective environmental and 
other standards in the candidate countries and the transition process increases 
economic competition as a result of market liberalisation. These effects may 
promote environmental integration at the societal level by further accelerating 
the process of industrial restructuring and modernisation, e.g. the shift towards 
the service sector and the closure of old, inefficient, and heavily polluting 
industrial plants and their replacement by modem, environmentally less harmful 
production technologies (Hager 2000. 18).
Environmental integration at the administrative and political levels could 
benefit from several factors. First, the Accession Countries have a tradition of 
planning, for example with respect to land use and “strategic” environmental 
impact assessment, which is an important tool of administrative environmental 
integration. At least in some Accession Countries the importance of 
environmental integration appears to have been recognised by environmental 
experts and policy-makers, in particular in the framework of accession (Jehlicka 
2001, 17-18). Second, the transition and accession processes tend to reduce the 
institutional rigidities which frequently hinder successful institutional reform, 
such as better inter-ministerial co-ordination and the establishment of 
independent and integrated environmental protection agencies. Third, accession 
has led to the formation of entirely new intra- and inter-sectoral co-ordination 
structures. For example, Slovenia has established an Office for European 
Integration which co-ordinates and monitors the transposition and 
implementation of EU legislation by the various ministries (ECE 1999, 3). 
Similar structures have been created in other Accession Countries. In addition to 
a central co-ordinating body, they usually include a European integration unit in 
the ministries which are most affected by the accession process. It may be 
possible for the Accession Countries to use their experiences in co-ordinating 
the accession process to design and implement measures to improve en­
vironmental integration. There may even be a possibility to use the existing co­
ordination structures for this purpose during the accession process and, in 





























































































Finally, the accession process provides the EU with the means to exert 
exceptionally strong influence on institutional reforms in the Accession 
Countries (cf. Grabbe 1999) which could be used to promote environmental 
integration. This opportunity appears to be particularly remarkable against the 
background that it is the fact that the Member States, rather than the 
Commission, are responsible for implementation, which partly accounts for the 
current implementation deficit. More specifically, the Commission has a much 
larger influence on how EU environmental legislation is implemented in 
Accession Countries than it normally has on implementation in the Member 
States. One of the reasons for this is that the Commission has been charged with 
assessing the Accession Countries’ progress in the approximation of EU 
legislation and in implementing the Union’s pre-accession strategy which 
supports the applicants in adopting and implementing EU legislation. The Com­
mission’s influence is further increased by a political power differential between 
the EU and Accession Countries which is caused by the fact that it is the Com­
mission and, ultimately, the present Member States which will eventually decide 
when, and under which conditions, an Accession Country may join the Union.22 
Under these circumstances it is no exaggeration to state that “the European 
Commission has taken the lead in defining the acquis communautaire for CEE” 
(ibid., 24). In doing so, the Commission could place a strong emphasis on 
environmental integration.
Despite these opportunities, the Commission - and the EU as a whole - so 
far has not given priority to achieving environmental integration in the 
framework of the accession process. This is exemplified by the approach to 
negotiating transitional periods. As pointed out above, the EU refuses to grant 
transitional measures for administratively particularly challenging directives. 
Given the incentives which such an approach creates for "cheating" among the 
Accession Countries, this choice reveals an overly conservative approach which 
focuses on the formal requirements of transposing and legally implementing the 
existing environmental acquis, rather than a concern with the administrative 
reforms needed for effective implementation and enforcement on the ground. 
However, it is precisely these kinds of more structural changes which are needed 
to promote environmental integration.
In addition to reducing the risk of a persistent implementation deficit in 
the Accession Countries, admitting transitional periods for administratively 
challenging legislation in both the environmental and, above all, in other sectors, 
such as transport and agriculture, may also contribute more directly to 
environmental integration. Despite a certain leeway in interpreting the acquis, 
the Commission has limited means of inducing the Accession Countries to 
implement the integration principle of Article 6 before the date of accession 




























































































acquis to be adopted by the applicants - so far only weakly reflects the in­
tegration principle. However, the Commission is likely to have even less 
influence once the Accession Countries have become regular Member States. As 
with implementation in general, if transitional periods for administrative 
requirements were granted, this would give the Commission better opportunities 
to promote environmental integration beyond the date of accession under an 
extended special pre-accession regime.
The way in which the Commission has handled the EU pre-accession 
strategy and the assistance programmes to support the Accession Countries also 
suggests that the Union has so far failed to promote environmental integration. 
In theory, the Phare programme could be used for this purpose. Thirty percent 
(about 500 million Euro) of the annual Phare budget are devoted to institutional 
capacity building in the Accession Countries. Yet, environmental integration so 
far has not been a priority. Similarly, environmental concerns have only been 
weakly integrated into the provisions of the Regulation on the Instrument for 
Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) which govern EU support for 
major infrastructure investment in the transport sector in the Accession 
Countries. The requirements on environmental safeguards of the ISPA 
Regulation tend to be weaker than the corresponding rules for the Cohesion 
Fund on which the ISPA programme was modelled. In addition, unlike the Co­
hesion Fund, ISPA only supports large projects.23 Consequently, 
environmentally friendly, smaller, and less capital intensive investment cannot 
be financed by ISPA.24 Furthermore, the Transport Infrastructure Needs 
Assessment (TINA) - the Commission’s main planning instrument for transport 
infrastructure investment in the Accession Countries - so far seems to have been 
subjected to less environmental impact assessment than the Trans-European 
Network for Transport (TEN-T), the corresponding measure for the present 
Member States. It remains to be seen whether the Commission will implement 
its intention to subject TINA to a full blown “strategic” environmental impact 
assessment (Fergusson 2000, 5-6).
Finally, insufficient attention to environmental integration in the European 
assistance programmes is frequently duplicated at the national level in the 
Accession Countries. Development plans and sectoral strategies which serve as 
a basis for decisions on many projects co-financed by the pre-accession funds 
have been prepared in a rush and, in some cases, are not even publicly available. 
Low transparency and scarce involvement of stakeholders has contributed to the 
fact that the commitment to environmental integration and sustainable 
development remains at the purely declaratory level in many plans (cf. CEE 





























































































This paper has discussed several reasons why EU enlargement will increase the 
need to promote sustainable development by putting environmental integration 
into practice. First, enlargement threatens to undermine the leader-laggard 
dynamic because most Accession Countries will probably oppose stringent 
environmental standards once they have joined the EU. Environmental 
pacesetters may therefore increasingly make use of mechanisms of flexible 
integration, for example the Treaty provisions on Enhanced Co-operation. This 
development could preserve the leader-laggard dynamic but might also create 
new problems in terms of undermining a satisfactory level of environmental 
protection throughout the EU. Second, enlargement also threatens to further 
increase the implementation deficit. No matter whether the first round of 
enlargement takes place in 2003 or, as seems more likely, a few years later, 
Accession Countries lack the financial resources and administrative capacities to 
achieve full practical implementation of EU environmental legislation by the 
date of accession. Among other things, this may lead to a further increase in 
regulatory flexibility on the part of the EU. Finally, environmental integration 
promises to contribute to preserving the important positive aspects of the state of 
the environment in CEE by helping the Accession Countries to chose a more 
sustainable path of development. In addition, environmental integration may 
reduce the risks inherent in increasingly flexible European integration and 
regulations by increasing support for environmental protection among sectoral 
actors at the societal, administrative, and political levels.
There are at least three reasons why the conditions for promoting 
environmental integration in the framework of enlargement are basically 
favourable: First, economic and institutional structures in the Accession 
Countries are currently relatively malleable due to the ongoing processes of 
transformation and EU accession. Second, the experiences and institutional 
structures resulting from the need to politically and administratively co-ordinate 
the accession process may be used to promote environmental integration. Third, 
against the background of an asymmetric distribution of power in favour of the 
EU during the process of enlargement, the EU can exert exceptionally strong 
influence on the Accession Countries in the framework of the special pre­




























































































In view of these circumstances it might be possible to significantly pro­
mote the integration of environmental concerns into sectoral policies in the Ac­
cession Countries were this aim to become a high priority of the EU accession 
strategy. If successful, such an initiative could contribute significantly to turning 
a group of potential environmental latecomers into future environmental 
pacesetters. As yet, the EU has, however, made few efforts to promote 
environmental integration in the framework of accession.
Ingmar von Homeyer 
Ecologic, Institute for International 































































































1 If anything, Scharpf s model of the joint decision trap applies to EU environmental policy in 
the 1970s (cf. Jordan 1999,7; Andersen 1997, 212).
2 Andersen (1997, 222-224) stresses the importance of competitive interaction between 
leaders and laggards. According to Zito (1999), EU ‘task expansion’ can mostly be explained 
in terms of Member State interests and the Commission’s influence on policy-making, 
although other explanations are relevant, too. He argues that more empirical research is 
needed to establish the overall explanatory value of accounts in terms of the influence of 
Member States vis-â-vis explanations which emphasise the independent role of the 
Commission.
3For a short overview, see Holzinger (1994, 76-77).
4For a similar classification, see Liberatore (1991, 286-289).
5 In addition, high product standards tend to prevail if consumers prefer, are willing to pay for, 
and are able to recognise, high-quality products (Scharpf 1998, 126-127).
6Process standards do not directly affect the Internal Market. Therefore it is easier for 
latecomers to push for EU regulations which reflect the lowest common denominator or to 
block any efforts at harmonisation. Given a liberalised Internal Market, this may subject the 
process of adjustment of process standards to strong pressures of economic competition. 
'Héritier (1995, 279) argues that the UK not only softened its position but also acted as a 
leader Member State in bringing about certain changes in the administrative requirements of 
EU environmental legislation.
8 In theory, the restrictions posed by unanimous decision-making could also be overcome by 
issue-linkage. However, in the day-to-day EU legislative process cross-sectoral issue-linkage 
is rarely practised due to the strong functional sectoralisation of decision-making. Intra­
sectoral issue linkage is more common but also less effective due to more limited 
opportunities for exchange (Golub 2000,4-5; Golub 1996, 710).
9 At the highest level, even the formally independent Commissioners play an important role in 
promoting the interests of ‘their’ Member States (Andersen 1997, 213, 216).
°In some of the more extreme cases pacesetters may also oppose EU legislation. In the early 
1990s several Member States, including the UK and Denmark, invoked the subsidiarity 
principle to call for a repatriation of environmental competencies. In addition, some 
environmental pacesetters emphasise the “environmental guarantee” of Article 95(4) EC 
(Liefferink/Andersen 1998, 258-259). Under certain conditions this provision gives a Member 
State the right to exceed EU environmental standards. However, although upward deviance 
from common standards tends to undermine EU competencies in the short term, it may lead to 
renewed calls for the adoption of harmonised European regulations in the longer run. 
uFor example, on complaints regarding the Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment 
the Commission comments that “it is obviously difficult for Commission departments to 
investigate cases where the quality of impact assessment is questioned or it is contended that 
their findings are not properly acted upon. Although the Directive contains Articles regarding 
the content of impact assessments, it is difficult to verify the compliance with them by 
national authorities; moreover, it is not always easy to contest the merits of a choice taken by 
national authorities” (EC 1999, 11).
l2There are different conceptions of how many steps are involved in the implementation of 
EU legislation. According to the Commission there are four steps: legal transposition, 
practical application, compliance, and enforcement (cf. EC 1997a). Evaluation and policy 
reform may be added (Nicolaides 1999, 5). Others distinguish merely between the stages of 




























































































distinction has the advantage that it explicitly deals with the question of resources which is 
relevant for the effects of enlargement on EU environmental policy.
13Although the UK is often regarded as a latecomer, it has a favourable record of 
implementing EU environmental legislation. This may partly be explained by the fact that the 
UK, which is one of the four large Member States, has better chances of influencing EU 
decision-making than smaller latecomers. In addition, the UK has more resources to 
implement policies than less wealthy countries. By contrast, Germany’s implementation re­
cord is mixed. Economic difficulties following German unification and the fact that some of 
the more recent environmental directives conflict with the traditional German regulatory 
approach partly account for the German record (Knill/Lenschow 1999). 
l4For example, the Large Combustion Plants Directive grants Spain a special transitional 
period for compliance with important requirements. In addition, Article 15 of the Single 
European Act allows for transitional periods if certain economies are disproportionately 
burdened by measures to create the Internal Market (Beck 1995, 150).
15 For details, see Young/Wallace (2000,41-50).
16It is particularly alarming that the link between economic growth and environmental 
pollution, which has significantly decreased in most Member States, still appears to be strong 
in many CEECs (Jahn 2001).
nThe EU Common Positions for the accession negotiations in the field of the environment 
contain statements to this extent (cf. Council of the European Union 1999, 1-2). In addition to 
the 1993 so-called Copenhagen Criteria for accession - among other things the ability to 
implement the acquis communautaire - the 1995 Madrid European Council emphasised the 
importance of the adjustment of administrative structures in the Accession Countries for 
membership (Mayhew 2000,6).
18Apparently, environmental experts and policy-makers in some of the most advances 
Accession Countries see the future position of their countries on EU environmental policy 
much closer to the position of the pacesetters than to that of the latecomers. However, given 
the factors mentioned above, it remains highly questionable whether such an assessment is 
realistic (cf. Jehlicka 2001, 19).
I9For a detailed analysis of the potential impact of the Nice Treaty on EU environmental 
policy, see Bar/Homeyer/Klasing (2001a).
20During the initial Screening process with the Commission, the Luxembourg Countries 
identified an even greater need for transitional periods than indicated in the Table. For details, 
see Homeyer/Kempmann/Klasing (1999).
21 Contributions to the discussion at the workshop ..Successful Environmental Policy: 
Building Constituencies in Central and Eastern European Accession Countries" held jointly 
by the Czech environment ministry and Ecologic, Institute for International and European 
Environmental Policy, Berlin (on behalf or the German environment ministry), 23 February 
2000, Prague. More generally, see also Agh (1999, 1995); Elster (1998, 281).
22Although Member States ultimately decide on accession, the long-drawn out pre-accession 
process of monitoring and influencing the adoption and implementation of EU legislation in 
the Accession Countries is a highly technical exercise which is dominated by the 
Commission. For the case of environmental legislation, see Homeyer/Carius/Bar (2000); 
Caddy (1997). More generally, see Jacoby (1999); Grabbe (1999a).
^Following complaints by Accession Countries and environmental NGOs there are plans to 
relax the 5 million Euro threshold. See ENDS Daily 5 May 2000.
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